The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 2
Number 1 Parameters 1972

Article 5

7-4-1972

MILITARY HISTORY FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
Benjamin F. Cooling III

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Benjamin F. Cooling III, "MILITARY HISTORY FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL," Parameters 2, no. 1
(1972), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1037.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

MILITARY HISTORY FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL
by

DOCTOR BENJAMIN F. COOLING I I I

history. Lately, antagonism toward war in
general, and to the war in Viet Nam in
particular, have further blurred any signs of
progress.
Some blame for the rejection of military
h i s t o r y r e s t s with military historians
themselves. Often they have reflected Millis'
impression that his compatriots were adrift,
unsure of their destination and uncertain as to
whether they were even carrying the correct
cargo. Millis thought that military history
should become less military and more civilian.
It would have to make better use of the
resources of political philosophy, economics,
and sociology as well as the applied sciences.
He felt that its success as a useful discipline
would depend upon its return to the general
study of man and his society. Twenty years
after Millis' stricture it seems that the guild of
military historians continues to suffer from
the old malaise. The eminent scholar Peter
Paret recently concluded:

(Can the study of military history be
useful for the military professional? What
would be the nature of a program
designed t o prepare the military
professional to face the challenges of the
future by studying the record of the
past?)

Two decades ago, at the height of the
K o r e a n conflict, a renowned military
historian claimed that military history as a
specialty had largely lost its function. "If
military history is to have more than
antiquarian interest, it must, it would seem,
turn away from the study of past wars to the
study of war itself in its broadest, possible
terms," declared Walter Millis.1 Since that
time professional historians who devote their
careers to analysis of military affairs have
worked to refute Millis' contention. At the
same time they have tried to overcome the
aversion of their colleagues to military

Far too much military history is being
written in America. In this respect, at
least, its condition does not differ from
that of other fields of history. But with
few exceptions, the character of the work
p r o d u c e d is extremely
conventional- descriptive history,
centering on leading figures, campaigns,
and climatic battles, often with a strong
antiquarian bent. Few enterprising minds
are interested in war and in military
institutions for their own sake.2
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If civilian professionals have moved slowly
to reshape one of the more "relevant"
subdisciplines of history in the post-Korea
period, many military professionals have been
equally reluctant to study past experience in
order to apply the knowledge gained to the
practice of their own craft. In a way, they
have reflected the reluctance of so many
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Americans to think about the past. Facing
backward, it would seem, would impede
progress in our future-oriented nation. But
this does not mean that military men have
failed to show great interest in certain facets
of military history. They are among the most
ardent devotees of Civil War and Second
World War battles and campaigns. They rally
to societies like the American Military
Institute, the Company of Military Historians,
and the Council on Abandoned Military Posts.
The very abundance of military museums
(fifty-nine for the Army alone at last count)
attests to the interest in the heritage of the
military profession.3
This so-called "drum and trumpet" history
is f r e q u e n t l y scoffed a t by civilian
academicians. But experience has shown that
maintaining a link with the past yields rich
dividends in the present by helping young and
old soldiers alike to identify with unit lineages
and to learn many technical lessons that are
useful for the future. 4 Disciples of Clio, the
muse of history, can muster many reasons
why senior armed services professionals need
to take another look at the experiences of
their forefathers. Indeed, the extensive
locations and variety of US military
commitments around the world, and the
increasing scope of Army educational
programs in recent years supports the need
f o r emphasis on historical perspective.
Concern with command and management,
strategy, national security policies, economics
and politics, international and domestic
conflicts and tensions, the composition of the
Army, and the impact of technology only
reinforces the need for a new and innovative
approach to military history by the military
leader-"Military History for the Military
Professional" let us call it.
Such military history may be studied either
in the classroom or independently. This paper
will suggest ten areas that might be included
in such a program. There are others, but a
program that incorporates the elements of
these ten areas can d o much to prepare the
military professional to face the challenges of
the future.
First, a military leader must comprehend
The Nature and Scope o f Military History. If
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The typical Confederate o f 1862. How well did he
reflect a Southern society composed o f planter
aristocracy, yeoman farmer, and Negro slave?
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The US Army as nation-builder-administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps
during the Great Depression.
history as a means for clarifying man's
proclivity for conflict.
Next, the military professional might
proceed to a historical analysis of the
relationship between Armed Forces and
Society. A premise may be made here that a
successful military institution must be a viable
part of and reflect the culture of which it
forms the sword and shield. In view of this
premise it seems important that there be an
examination of the fabric of societies and
their military establishments throughout
history. A wide variety of societies suggest
themselves for study. For instance, the
Ancient World, which should include not only
Greece and Rome (that have interested
Western scholars for so long due to their
influence on the spawning of modern

past remains prologue, then there must be an
understanding of the endless, complex, and
perplexing contrasts and inconsistencies of
the past and their applicability to the future.
The relationship of military history t o other
d i s c i p l i n e s , i.e., economics, sociology,
political science, the physical sciences, and
even other areas of history must be
highlighted. Such an introduction can come
f r o m t h e reading of sound military
historiographical work. 5 Specific questions
might be posed on the role of the military in
the study of war and conflict, the use and
abuse of military history by the military
profession, historical methodology, and the
facilities and agencies for the study of the
craft. At this stage the professional soldier
should concern himself with understanding
30
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U . S . i nfantry in the Philippines participated in a popular "war for empire" which lost support of American
citizens when it became a prolonged suppression of Philippine insurrectionists.

United States. But they might benefit
additionally from a periodic review of how
the American military profession reflects
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c i v i l i z a t i o n and its
development.6 Such inquiry can help t o
reinforce a sense of pride on the one hand,
while serving as a timely reminder that the
Anglo-American tradition places the soldier's
roots in an essentially civilian society. Failure
t o keep this basic fact in mind at all times
could lead to the disasters that have occurred
in various European, Asian, and other nations
which have made the military a caste apart
from civilian society .7
A t h i r d area for possible scrutiny
encompasses Command and Control Through
the Centuries. There are recognizable aspects
of high command and management as we

institutions), but also China, a society that
has contributed so much to civilization.
Similarly, attention should be given t o a study
of the cultural-military ancestry of those
n a t i o n s which o p e r a t e u n d e r t h e
socio-political system of Islam. Finally, the
impact of the tribal societies of the great Zulu
and Botswana should be compared with the
influence exerted by European colonialism.
Such study can illuminate shadowy areas of
civil-military relations and the interaction of
military affairs and society in those polyglot
African political entities emerging in the wake
of disimperialism.
American military professionals may feel
that they understand fully the subtle
relationships between military and civilian
sectors of Western European nations and the
31

examine the past thirty centuries. The
biographical approach to military history is
hardly new. "Great Captains" have been
studied many times in the past. Today, this
concept can include more than an analysis of
leadership styles and the way in which the
so-called principles of war were practiced.
Such a study can clarify varying nationalistic
t e r m i n o l o g i e s a n d interpretations of
command, staff concepts, and participatory
leadership. Special attention must be paid to
the evolution of Napoleonic, Suvarovian,
German, and Anglo-American leadership
modes and styles.8 However, today's military
professional can utilize both ancient and
modern examples of leadership, and eastern as
well as western. If Mao and Giap are currently
in vogue, their forebears are legion, and there
appears t o be no dearth of material for more
conventional "Great Captains," from Scipio
Africanus and Saladin t o Zhukov and
Montgomery.
The conglomerate, multi-social makeup of
contemporary American society as reflected
in our military forces points t o a fourth area,
The Historical Human Composition of
Military Forces. The wide ethnic and
nationalistic variations in armies might
explain the success and failure of employing
non-white or alien military units and
i n d i v i d u a l s in American and western
European forces. The Roman use of Gauls,
Iberians, and Franks as Auxilia; the Turkish
employment of Janissaries, a foreign military
elite; the French utilization of Senegalese and
Tonkinese Tirailleurs; the British experience
with Indian sepoys; the American practice of
all-black units, Indian "scouts," and
P h i l i p p i n e Constabulary; the Russian
integration of a Cossack minority group; and
the International Brigade's participation in
the Spanish Civil War, are subject areas which
could offer some lessons in this regard.9
VOLAR planners may discover some very
useful information if they investigate why and
h o w t h e s e alien units found
e m p l o y m e n t- t h e i r advantages and
disadvantages in terms of discipline, morale,
efficiency-as well as the question of their
social position within the military institution
itself and the chance of their being assimilated
and being advanced in society.
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The continued high priority of national
security policy formulation by senior planners
dictates a fifth need: an understanding of the
common and unique elements of National
Security Policies Through the Ages. An
analysis of the issues of vital national interest
over the centuries can be richly rewarding for
t h e continued evolution of American
programs. There are numerous strands of
continuity between the concerns of the
modern world and the historic interests of
Republican and Imperial Roman expansion
and defense, Byzantine concern with survival,
the counter-thrust of Russia against invasions
a n d "enemies on all sides," German
Reich-building, French mesmerization with
nationalism and prestige, British home island
defense and protection of the trade routes for
survival, and interaction between insular
Japan and China, the continental giant. In
addition, military planners of the present and
future should be aware of the passage of the
United States through three distinct stages of
security concern. These include America's
transition from emerging nation, through her
continental expansion, t o participation as a
major nation-state in the world power struggle
with relationships t o the national security
concerns of other nations.10 Nowhere have
such developments taken place in isolation.
Indeed, t o appreciate modern security
requirements throughout the world it would
seem fundamental for American military
officials to appreciate certain traditional
elements and causative factors in these
requirements.
The Interaction of Military, Political, and
Diplomatic Affairs provides still another area
f o r s e r i o u s investigation by military
professionals. Throughout history the military
man has been more than simply the servant t o
diplomats and civil authority. Rather, armed
forces personnel have also been diplomatic
representatives in their own right, involved in
activities ranging from daily relations with
foreign citizenry t o higher roles as makers of
policy and alliances. The phenomenon is not
new and it continues t o comprise a major
p h a s e o f m i l i t a r y activity. The
soldier-as-diplomat can be studied in the
experiences of counselors like Max Bauer,
Chiang Kai-Shek's first German military

outbreak of the February 1917 revolution in
Russia. Perhaps the conduct of the Roman
legions, thwarted for years by Palestinian
revolt, will not seem so strange when in 70
A.D. they levelled Jerusalem, sparing neither
buildings nor inhabitants.
Balancing this portrayal of the military as
guardians of internal order, sometimes at the
expense of personal freedom, would be the
eighth area of concentration, Nationbuilding
Activities o f the Military. Indeed, the man in
uniform has often contributed to society in
ways other than with a rifle at the ready.
Military institutions have been called upon
frequently to participate in nonwar-related
endeavors and national projects because of
critically needed skills. High levels of
organization, discipline, concentration of
available aptitudes, and administrative
abilities have led the military into historic
roles in engineering, technology, medicine,
education, and social involvement. From
Roman road building to American flood
control projects; from the introduction of the
stirrup by the Mongols to US A r m y
supervision of the Manhattan Project; from
Napoleonic medicine to American cure of
yellow fever; from West Point and St. Cyr as
the early collegiate institutions oriented
t o w a r d scientific training t o the
democratizing element of military service for
immigrants t o American shores, the
uniformed services have built as well as
destroyed in the name of civilization.13 The
man on horseback has not always been a
threat to the state; witness the contributions
of Kemal Ataturk, George Washington, or
Oliver Cromwell. Senior officers might very
well find knowledge of such phenomena very
useful when countering the derogatory image
of their profession held by so many civilians
today.
We should be particularly curious about a
ninth area in our new approach to military
history: Unpopular Wars and Military
Operations. Certain military episodes in
history have produced sharp divisions
between governmental policy and public
support. Citizen approval in periods of
c o n f l i c t r e m a i n s directly related to
achievement of m i l i t a r y goals and

adviser; missions such as Perry's naval
expedition to Japan in 1854; participants in
postwar peace negotiations such as
Panmunjom; or disarmament negotiations in
London and Washington after World War I.
Expeditionary operations like the Allied
maneuvers in northern Russia; occupation
activities which pinned down Federal troops
in the Reconstructed South; pacification
programs of European powers in Africa; and
formulation of military alliances such as the
Imperial Defence Agreement of 1887 between
Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, all
displayed t h e military m a n in a
quasi-diplomatic role.11 Simply put, the
modern senior officer should be aware of the
role of the military as it interacted with
political and diplomatic affairs from Pax
Romana to Pax Americana. Might not the
study of such experiences as American
pacification of the Philippines after the
Spanish War have enabled our policy makers
to avoid the frustration accompanying recent
efforts of this nature in Southeast Asia?
Likewise, the modern officer should find
useful the historical perspective of Internal
Crisis a n d Military Force. Domestic
disturbances are far from unique to the
present generation or even to the American
scene. Military organizations throughout
history have been charged with the promotion
and protection of domestic tranquility as well
as defense against external threat. Rebellion
took place in Republican Rome, and domestic
unrest has long been endemic to the Far East
in China and India. The French Revolution,
English experiences in North America as well
as their home islands during the Industrial
R e v o l u t i o n , a n d t w e n t i e t h century
manifestations of internal disturbances in
Mexico, Ireland, and Russia can all contribute
to any discussion of the role of the military in
domestic crises from ancient to modern times.
Certainly the role of American airborne units
patrolling the streets of Washington in 1968
fits the pattern of our experience from the
Whiskey Rebellion to modern labor and racial
unrest.12 It should prove enlightening to
examine the actions of the French line army
during the early stages of the French
Revolution, or the Petrograd garrison in the
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performance. It is important for the modern
officer to examine historically the viewpoints
of man as he went about fulfilling his
obligations vis-a-vis the nation, especially in
wartime. The nature of governmental
involvement in a specific unpopular war or
operation can shed light upon public
relations, the goals of popular opposition, and
the impact on state policy. Analysis of
specific wars may include the War of 1812,
which nearly tore apart the youthful,
struggling American republic, and produced
cases of militia refusal to invade foreign soil
during major operations. Similarly, the
Mexican War, the Philippine Insurrection, and
British participation in the Boer War and Suez
operation of 1956 produced deep cleavages in
the body politic.14 French involvement in
Indochina toppled one government at home
in the late nineteenth century, and we are all
aware of the impact of that same area,
together with Algeria, upon the stability of
modern France. One may suspect that this
topic will continue to interest present and
future generations of American military
planners, especially as increasing numbers of
i n f o r m e d c i t i z e n r y wonder why we
remembered nothing and forgot nothing from
the experiences of Frenchmen on the Asian
mainland.
Just as military affairs have been affected
by social and technical change, military affairs
have had a continuous effect upon the
shaping of technology and society. Thus,
Technology, Culture, and Warfare provides an
appropriate capstone to this one approach to
military history for the military professional.
The interaction has been continuous and
accelerating, with long historical roots and
antecedents. The modern officer need not be
held captive by specifics of the screw
propeller, the machine gun, or the atomic
bomb. Instead, he should be more concerned
with the full scope of technology and society
since the Industrial Revolution. He might
c o n s i d e r t h e c o n s t r u c t i v e versus
non-constructive aspects of the interaction of
war and technology without subverting his
professional integrity. In fact, all segments of
society need to become more aware of the
"case for war" school of thought whose

disciples like Warner Sombart, Lewis
Mumford, F. W. Nietzsche and Stanislav
Andreski have stressed the positive force of
war in societal and technological progress.
Their antagonists, including Arnold Toynbee,
John U. Nef and others have countered that
war and its concomitant military burdens
have always been the "proximate cause" of
the breakdown of every civilization in the
past.15
If this exercise appears too ephemeral or
esoteric to the average professional soldier he
need only remember that the place of conflict
in society remains central to the continuing
issues of our times. Questions of modern
economics, organization and administration,
l a b o r , product standardization, conflict
limitation, civil government, democracy,
nationalism, and culture and the arts-as they
relate to military affairs-must be considered
and understood by all military professionals.
The United States Army stands at another
critical juncture in its history. Officers should
be encouraged to look at the past in order to
make t h e present and future more
meaningful. This does not imply that they
should be preoccupied solely with the Army's
past and with lineage rosters or with glorious
deeds of valor and sacrifice, however
praiseworthy this approach. Instead they
should examine the way in which the
American military profession fits into the
broader stream of the history of military
affairs. Military professionals need not be tied
uncritically to the past with its mistakes or
successes. They should not accept facts on
face value. They should be acutely aware that
the study of military history can offer
guidelines that can prevent their "reinventing
the wheel." General George Patton said, "To
be a successful soldier you must know
history." We think he was right.
NOTES
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